![]() ![]() It is dangerous for the profession of philosophy-for the conventions that govern the way we produce and discuss philosophical texts, its roles and its rules. Kusters’ book is dangerous not only for one’s “mental health,” whatever that might amount to. Instead of a lazy stream, why not experience time as a raging river, which accelerates and decelerates unpredictably? Or a gentle pond which allows you to move effortlessly in any direction? Or for that matter, a whirlpool, where past and future merge and where one is violently wrenched out of a shared reality? How can anybody read Husserl thoughtfully and carefully and stay sane? But now that Husserl has opened the door to the casual use of water metaphors, what stops us from having a bit of fun, and deploying other metaphors? If we were careful and thorough in this procedure, we would likely alter the temporal structure of experience. Time consciousness, Husserl tells us, is like a flowing stream, with its facets of retention and protention smuggled into the present moment. The problem has to do with Husserl’s reckless use of water metaphors, the most pertinent being the stream. Rather, it is to demonstrate to the reader precisely how the study of Husserl’s writings on time can precipitate a psychotic episode. Kusters’ goal is not merely to relate the biographical fact that a careful study of Husserl led to an involuntary hospitalization (as in, “I was studying Husserl one day, and then things got a bit out of hand, and then the ambulance arrived”). Consider the passage on Husserl’s phenomenology of time (243–253). It is to lead the reader right up to the precipice of madness, and perhaps, right over it. It is not primarily to contemplate, or even to represent, the relation between philosophy and madness. Kusters makes no attempt to conceal his disruptive agenda. For the mad, the very structure and integrity of the world may pivot on how we choose to interpret certain passages in Husserl, or Plotinus, or Charles Taylor. For the mad person, “solipsism” is not an abstract theory but a concrete manner of experiencing the world. The difference is that the conventional philosopher approaches these problems in a detached, theoretical way. They share the same object and end: the supreme principle of reality the structure of time, space, and persistence the mystery of being and non-being the incomprehensible glory of God. What makes this indeterminacy possible is that philosophy and madness are “after” the same thing. What, exactly, is the relationship between madness and philosophy? What is the relationship between the two such that it is possible for a text to occupy an indeterminate position between philosophical exposition and mad diary? Philosophical musings alternate with fragments of a mad diary at such a dizzying rate that there are lengthy passages where the reader simply does not know whether she is reading a philosophical exposition or a mad diary.īut the fact that this is possible, that is, the fact that a text could be indeterminate in this manner (madness or philosophy?), points to a profound problem, one that the entire book is designed to confront. A careful exposition of the schizophrenic “word salad” transforms, almost imperceptibly, into word salad. A meditation on water metaphors in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness culminates in an involuntary hospitalization. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |